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Therefore, as we launch this debate about access and opportunity in Europe, I think it is important 
to focus on some key issues: 
- why one fifth of school children don’t reach the basic standards of literacy and numeracy; 
- why one in six young people are still leaving school without any qualifications, when we know 
that fewer and fewer unskilled jobs will be available; 
- why there is still a strong correlation between students achieving a place at university and the 
educational background of their parents. In the knowledge economy we have to ensure higher 
educational standards for a broad majority; 
- why some Member States are so much better than others at integrating second generation 
migrants, enabling them to achieve more in the education system; 
- why access to childcare is so patchy when the evidence is so strong that better childcare leads to 
higher fertility, more job opportunities for women and greater gender equality; 
- why child poverty continues to blight the prospects of a fair start in life for a fifth of Europe’s 
children; 
- why work is a strain and stress for too many, and decent family life and traditional support 
structures are put under too much pressure; 
- why so many older people drop out of the labour force too early when in an ageing society we 
can ill-afford to throw their talents and contributions on the scrap heap. 
José Manuel Barroso, 5 December 2006, speaking of The New Social Reality of Europe 
1 
 
 
Over the last fifteen years most of the countries with liberal and social democratic welfare 
regimes have redesigned their social policy, undertaking what they describe as a 
“modernisation.”  Social protection constituted the basic notion of post-1945 welfare regimes but 
pooling resources to protect against consequences of ageing, ill-health, or job loss is no longer 
considered an adequate response to social risks.  Redesign has been in a shared direction, albeit 
with significant variations across regime types and cases.  Policy communities now assert that 
economic dynamism depends on modernising social models, and they claim that the social 
policies of these models must involve investment because a principal goal of any new social 
architecture is to prevent intergenerational transfer of disadvantage.  Now the idea is to be 
proactive rather than compensatory.  One result of this shift in ideas is that the definition of the 
best policy mix often targets children and youth; attention to women and gender equality is 
flagging.   
 
The European Union has only recently begun to manifest an interest in the new analyses that we 
have labelled the LEGO
® paradigm (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006).  The speech by 
Commission President Barroso quoted above reflects, however, this recent take up of the LEGO
® 
rhetoric.  Careful attention to this quote reveals that there is relatively little attention to women 
and gender equality.  This is surprising in an EU statement on “access and opportunity.”  There 
are long-standing claims of women’s movements in many countries as well as at the level of the 
Union for greater opportunity for women and better access to all sites of decision-making and 
power.  While many of the concerns of feminists – from family forms and relations to services 
such as childcare and access to higher education – are mentioned, they are framed quite 
differently and located in different kinds of arguments than earlier.   
 
We might ask, therefore, what have been and might be the consequences for women of taking up 
LEGO-like ideas?  In some countries where they are well advanced, policy attention to gender 
equality has been significantly side-lined (Dobrowolsky and Jenson, 2004).  Is or will the same 
                                                 
1 This speech was given at a meeting organised by the Policy Network in Brussels (Barroso, 2006).   Jenson, EUSA 2007   3 
thing happen in the European Union, where the governmental machinery for equal opportunities 
– now termed gender equality – has been so robust? 
 
Answering such questions requires several analytic steps.  A first is to document the move 
towards LEGO
® at the EU level.  The second is to tease out and untangle the consequences for 
the way the EU addresses gender equality, an objective which has been associated with the 
Union if not from the insertion of article 119 into the Treaty of Rome certainly since the 1970s.  
For some researchers, there has been backtracking on the more ambitious agenda of the 1990s.  
Maria Stratigaki (2004), for example, argues that the incorporation of the instruments to 
reconcile work and family life (childcare, parental leaves, working time improvements) into the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) constitutes a process of “cooptation,” because the original 
feminist potential of the instrument has been subordinated to market-oriented priorities.  What 
the next pages document in the more recent chapters of this story is more than cooptation; it is 
one of writing women out of the plot or folding them in to other stories. 
 
The European Union picks up LEGO
® 
 
Observed convergence around ideas for a social architecture that involves themes of 
modernization of social models via activation and new forms of investment have prompted us to 
identify a common shift toward a LEGO
® paradigm (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006).  The liberal 
welfare regimes have been in the lead on some dimensions while on others it is the social 
democratic regimes that have been policy innovators.  The social investment emphasis was 
present in the analyses of Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) by 
the mid-1990s and in “third way” Britain by the late 1990s (Saint-Martin, 2000; Dobrowolsky 
and Jenson, 2005).   The European Union has been significantly slower to move in these 
directions.  In recent years, however, there are increasing signs of adaptation and adoption of 
many of the ideas by the Union. 
 
The principles of this analysis are captured well in this paragraph: 
 
Children are our role models. Children are curious, creative and imaginative. … Lifelong 
creativity, imagination and learning are stimulated by playful activities that encourage 
“hands-on and minds-on” creation, fun, togetherness and the sharing of ideas. People who 
are curious, creative and imaginative, i.e. people who have a childlike urge to explore and 
learn, are best equipped to thrive in a challenging world and be the builders of our 
common future.
2 
 
This discourse of constant learning, knowledge and human capital acquisition, involvement, and 
engagement captures a good deal of thinking about the knowledge-based economy of the present 
as well as the need to invest now to ensure collective advantage in the future.  Therefore, the 
LEGO
® name serves our purposes in two ways.  It is a metaphor, describing convergence around 
some basic building blocks of an emerging social architecture.  It is also an ideal-type, capturing 
                                                 
 
2 This quotation is from the webpage entitled fundamental beliefs, consulted 26 July 2005. 
www.lego.com/eng/info/default.asp?page=beliefs   Jenson, EUSA 2007   4 
the key features of the future-oriented, investment-centred activation strategy currently 
advocated as a blueprint for welfare state redesign.  
 
This quote from the corporate web site describing the company’s philosophy illustrates at least 
three key features.  First, while LEGO is a toy, involving play, it is also about a life-long 
commitment to learning in order to work.  Indeed, play is work because work is – supposedly – 
creative and playful.  Second, this philosophy is future-oriented.  Children now are already 
creating the future.
3  Ensuring future success will depend on what happens to them.  Finally, for 
LEGO, successful play in childhood benefits more than individual children; it enriches our 
common future.  Activity in the present is beneficial for the community as a whole. These three 
ideas can be seen as three principles, analysed in this section. 
 
Security depends on employability and learning 
In modern industrial societies, security has always depended upon the employment of a salaried 
or independent worker.  However, over much of the 20
th century, that employment was of a male 
breadwinner, whose wages could usually (and especially during the trente glorieuses after 1945) 
support a family of several dependents.  Therefore, social policy was premised on the need to 
compensate for the unemployment, sickness, retirement or absence of the male breadwinner.  In 
recent decades that pattern has changed in two ways.  First, rising rates of female employment 
have reduced the place of the male breadwinner and second the restructuring of wages has 
decreased the capacity of the family to live on a single wage.  
 
These changes have generated new ways of thinking about security.   Policy analysts now claim 
that individuals’ security depends less on protection from threats to male breadwinning and more 
on the capacity to confront challenges and adapt successfully to challenges over the life course or 
coming from unstable labour markets (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006: 435 and passim).   
Important challenges are defined as those at key life transitions such as entry into school, the 
school-work transition, breakdown of a couple relationship and so on. 
 
Adaptation to these challenges comes first from increasing the capacity of all adults to be 
actively engaged in the labour market, and secondly to increase individuals own adaptive skills, 
primarily via the habits of learning.  Ingrained habits supposedly foster acquisition of new or up-
dated skills as well as flexibility.  In particular, reliance on acquired human capital – rather than 
specific skills or training – is proposed as a response to the changes associated with de-
industrialisation, the growth of services and, particularly, the emergence of a knowledge-based 
economy.  It is touted as the way to ensure continued connection to a rapidly changing labour 
market and to ensure sufficient earning capacity.   
 
Following the lead of the OECD as well as the Nordic countries, in a first series of moves 
towards activation, the European Union made commitments to activation and to “making work 
pay” the cornerstone of a sustainable European social model.  As early as 1993 the White Paper 
on Employment, Growth and Competitiveness claimed that the new model of European society 
                                                 
 
3 This may seem little more than a banal statement, but controversy over addressing children “in the here and now” 
or treating them as “adults in becoming” is a lively one. See, for example, Lister (2003) and OECD (2001: 8).  For 
the limits to treating the child as the “model citizen” see Jenson (2001).   Jenson, EUSA 2007   5 
called for less passive and more active forms of solidarity, to be achieved not only through 
greater flexibility in employment conditions but also active labour market policies to encourage 
mobility and life-long education (Ross, 2002: 73).  These instruments were reinforced by the 
1997 commitment to a European Employment Strategy.  By 2003, the promotion of life-long 
learning had become one of three overarching and inter-related objectives that were transversal 
to the priorities of that strategy (Mosher and Trubek, 2002: 71-72).  The same themes were 
present in the 10-year Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs launched in 2000. It started from the 
position that (European Council, March 2000, art. 25):
4 
 
Europe's education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands of the 
knowledge society and to the need for an improved level and quality of employment. 
They will have to offer learning and training opportunities tailored to target groups at 
different stages of their lives: young people, unemployed adults and those in employment 
who are at risk of seeing their skills overtaken by rapid change.  
 
Improving life-long learning for these target groups was necessary (art. 28).  
 
The EES and the Lisbon analysis of the economic problems facing Europe were, however, still 
anchored within the terms of the European social model as understood during the 1990s. When 
investment was mentioned, the commitment was to “modernising the European social model by 
investing in people” (art. 5; 25). 
 
By the time of the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy in 2004, however, the interpretation of 
the problem had been reconfigured.  Both the conclusions of the June 2005 European Council 
and the Communication from the Commission (European Commission, 2005a) that preceded and 
helped shaped the discussion relied on two key terms that had been virtually absent from the 
Lisbon documents – youth and human capital.
5  The Communication from the Barroso 
Commission entitled A new start for the Lisbon strategy set out the terms of a European youth 
initiative which included emphases on employment, education and training.  Whereas youth had 
been one target among several in the original Lisbon strategy, during the mid-term review the 
needs and situation of young people were front and centre.  The youth initiative, described in that 
paper, and indeed the communication as whole, was framed in terms of human capital; 
expanding and improving investment in human capital became one of the Integrated Guidelines 
for Growth and Jobs that was a major outcome of the mid-term review (European Council, 
2005a: Annex II; Rodriques in Diamond, 2006: 51).
6  
 
By 2005 LEGO-like notions had begun, in other words, to circulate much more widely within 
the European institutions.  In 2006, moreover, the framing of learning took a huge leap in this 
                                                 
4 All references to European Council Presidency Conclusions are to the versions available on 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm 
 
5 The concept of human capital was mentioned only once in the Conclusions of the 2000 European Council, and 
only twice in the book published after the Portuguese Presidency (Rodriques, 2002) while young people were 
similarly absent from the academic and political conclusions.  
 
6 The 2004 Kok Report, that shaped much of the midterm discussion, relied extensively on the concept of human 
capital, as did the 2003 Kok Report on employment creation (High Level Group, 2004; Task Force, 2003).   Jenson, EUSA 2007   6 
direction, as the DG Education and Culture (EAC) began to focus on investment in early 
childhood education and care (ECEC), thereby extending life-long learning backwards in the 
life-course.  The investment-focused thinking of the communication on Efficiency and equity in 
European education and training systems led to the recommendation to concentrate spending in 
the early years.  As the Communication put it in September 2006, “pre-primary education has the 
highest rates of return of the whole lifelong learning continuum, especially for the most 
disadvantaged, and the results of this investment build up over time” (European Commission, 
2006a: 3). 
 
This position was a clear innovation in euroanalysis, having been absent from the contributions 
of the Education, Youth and Culture Committee to the mid-term review (where early education 
was mentioned only as a factor for social cohesion and citizenship) and previous expert reports 
from the DG as well as the two Kok reports which had emphasised only investment in human 
capital.  The spring 2007 paper from the Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA – a DG 
that reports directly to the President of the Commission and acts under his authority) went even 
further, adopting classic LEGO
®  formulations, focused on children, youth and investments in 
human capital (BEPA, 2007: 1):
7  
 
Investing in youth means investing in human capital and social capital, starting early but 
not stopping there.  Human capital needs permanent upgrading all along the life-course.  
The economy of tomorrow relies first and foremost on the use of its human resources.  
‘Investment’ should be interpreted in a broad sense that includes personal investment by 
youth themselves, parents, schools, various layers of government and other stakeholders. 
The investment is not only monetary, but involves time, effort, and social and cultural 
investments too.  If adequately managed, these investments may yield substantial private 
and social returns.  
 
We see, in other words, that as the Commission increasingly defined its goals for 
“modernisation” of the social model in terms of maximising human capital investments, the 
instruments identified as the means to achieve successful investment also altered.  Spending on 
ECEC in the early years took pride of place, while spending on remedial adult education began 
to receive less attention.  
 
Orientation to the future 
For those committed to the LEGO
® principles, social policy is future-oriented precisely because 
it is investment-oriented and stresses human capital, which is developed during childhood and 
adolescence so as to be used later.  Investments imply a particular notion of time; they generate 
dividends in the future, whereas consumption (labelled an expense by accountants) occurs in the 
present (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003: 83).  This time perspective discourages “passive 
                                                 
7  This is a revised version of a paper from October 2006 which began in this way: “To speed up the modernisation 
of our social model(s) we have to think in terms of social investments. Investing in children and youth is a way to 
recast social protection and modernise social policies which fail to take into account the risks associated to changing 
family patterns and the needs of the labour market” (BEPA, 2006: 2 bold in original).  The emphasis on children 
remains in the revised document, primarily in its first substantive chapter, which calls for universal early childhood 
education and care (ECEC) as the foundation of investments in human capital (BEPA, 2007). 
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expenditures” whose effects are only realised in the present and they encourage a focus on 
childhood because the returns on investment are supposedly better, as we see in this reference: 
“Investing early is much more efficient than repairing later” (BEPA, 2007: vi, emphasis in the 
original).
8   
 
For at least a decade there has been a future orientation to the Union’s thinking about 
modernising the social model; as the now classic quote from the Lisbon strategy puts it, the 
strategic goal of the Union is “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy” and with a time horizon of a decade.  The difference between that formulation and one 
in terms of LEGO
® involves a shift in instruments and settings to reach that goal.  
 
Increasingly this future orientation has taken on a distinct LEGO
® colouration via more and 
more attention going to opportunities for children to ensure their future.  The notion that child 
poverty mortgages the future (a key element of LEGO
® thinking) is relatively new one within 
Eurospeak.  The basic idea, present in liberal welfare regimes and international organisations 
since the mid-1990s, is that a childhood of disadvantage significantly increases the risk of failure 
in the future.  Lone-parent families and working poverty are, then, a “new social risk” not only 
(and perhaps less) for reasons of social justice in the present than because they represent greater 
chances of inequalities and – particularly – social problems such as school failure, encounters 
with the criminal justice system, low income and so on, in the future. 
 
Present in a very limited way in some of the research documents associated with the Lisbon 
Council in 2000 (only Esping-Andersen in Rodriques, 2002), this focus made significant 
headway during the Belgian presidency of fall 2001 and subsequently. The focus on child 
poverty comes from two policy communities – one concerned with the sustainability of the 
European social model and one focused on social inclusion.  They are intersecting but distinct, 
giving rise to analyses such as those in Esping-Andersen et al., Why we need a new welfare state 
(2002) and those represented recently by Marlier, Atkinson, Cantillon and Nolan, The EU and 
social inclusion. Facing the Challenges (2006) as well as increasingly to the work of the Social 
Protection Committee and its social inclusion processes.
9   
 
The future was also front and centre in the recommendations for spending on ECEC in the 2006 
Communication,  Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems.  The 
document includes a dramatic graph of the rates of return, with the curve being spectacularly 
high for pre-primary education, especially for children from disadvantaged backgrounds, and 
tailing off for spending on adult education.  
 
                                                 
8 Here the authors are clearly following the position of an epistemic community that includes academics and 
decision-makers.  See for example, the quote from Gøsta Esping-Andersen, a member of the Group of Societal 
Policy Advisers (GSPA) of the BEPA: “As Esping-Andersen (2002) puts it, ‘There is one basic finding that 
overshadows all others, namely that remedial policies for adults are a poor and costly substitute for intervention in 
childhood. Solid investments in children and youth now will diminish welfare problems among future adults.’” 
(BEPA, 2007: 2).  On the GSPA, see BEPA. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/experts_groups/gspa_en.htm 
 
9 The emphasis on child poverty has increased steadily over time in the annual joint reports on social inclusion.  
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We see in this – albeit limited – selection of quotations that there is an increasing tendency to 
make achievement of the Union’s future goals dependent on instruments and settings that 
themselves are designed for pay-offs in the future. Turning again to an epistemic community, 
this time economists (much influenced by inter alia, James Heckman) we read: “Research has 
highlighted that high quality investments in the care, the education and the well-being of young 
children have important long term returns” (BEPA, 2007: 5; also European Commission, 2006a: 
5). 
 
We all benefit from playing play with LEGO
® 
Public policy focused on the future and investments is meant to meet not only the needs of the 
individuals but also the whole community.  Supposedly it will permit a more efficient use of 
resources, because investment now is less costly than remediation later.  In addition, however, 
the mounting attention to European demography brings with it efforts to identify successful 
responses to the new social risks.  By 2005 and the Green Paper on intergenerational solidarity, 
better organisation of childcare (parental as well as non-parental) was a key mechanism for 
avoiding major risk: “Never in history has there been economic growth without population 
growth. … if appropriate mechanisms existed to allow couples to have the number of children 
they want, the fertility rate could rise overall….” (European Commission, 2005b: 5).  The worry 
is that falling or low fertility rates may cause economic growth to falter, government budgets 
may be stretched to pay for pensions and health services, and there may be too few adults of 
working age to provide care and support for the elderly.  In this way, the future of European 
society is explicitly linked to the capacity to address the new social risks, and particularly those 
linked to the basic relationship of any welfare regime – the methods for reconciling work and 
family responsibilities.  Social care, especially child care but also care for the dependent elderly, 
has become an even larger concern for the Union. 
 
Attention to child care is, of course, not new in and of itself.  In the 1980s and 1990s the 
Commission participated in a wide-spread tendency to see access to reliable and affordable child 
care as a central plank in any agenda for equal opportunities between women and men (Ross, 
2001).  While the experts that promoted the development of child care always set the issue in an 
educational frame, it is only recently that such a frame, with its notion of win-win for individuals 
and society, has come to the fore in mainstream policy thinking (OECD, 2001 for example).  For 
society, the benefits are in the present to be sure – higher employment rates: “… experience 
shows that Member States having comprehensive policies to reconcile work and family life for 
both men and women show higher fertility rates as well as higher labour market participation of 
women” (European Commission, 2005c: 3). But the benefits are also realised in the future, 
because ECEC provides the foundation for more human capital (that is better qualified future 
workers) and higher fertility rates (that is more future contributors to pension and other social 
programmes). 
 
Are there consequences of embracing LEGO
®  – for women and for the EU’s strategies for 
gender equality? 
 
In recent years the European Union has both constitutionalised equal rights and built up a 
significant amount of governmental machinery to advance these Treaty guarantees.  The Treaty 
identifies equality between women and men as a fundamental value to be promoted (article 2)   Jenson, EUSA 2007   9 
and lays down the principle of gender mainstreaming (article 3)
10.  The Treaty also 
constitutionalises pro-active measures to combat discrimination based on sex as well as racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (article 13).  The 
employment chapters also provide widened protections and promises.  As Jo Shaw writes (2002: 
217): “In sum, Article 141 is now a much wider gender equality norm than was the original 
Article 119 and the changed opportunity structure for gender equality policy-making contributes 
substantially to the polity-defining and substantive aspects of constitutionalism.” 
 
Directives underpin these guarantees,
11 and governmental machinery has gone from being a 
relatively small Equal Opportunities unit to a full Directorate within the D-G Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, meriting not only its own four sub-units but also a part 
of the name of the Directorate-General itself.   One of the units is primarily concerned with 
gender mainstreaming and specific actions, while a second is concerned with legal questions 
arising from the relevant directives.
12  Visibility of the issue of gender equality is also raised by 
the requirement – which is also a right – to make an annual report on equality between women 
and men in the European Union to the spring European Council.
13  The European Council in 
March 2006 agreed to a European Pact for Gender Equality.  And finally, in late 2006 a 
European Institute for Gender Equality was added to the institutional mix, to be located in 
Vilnius, capital of Lithuania.   
 
Why worry then?  Attention to achieving equality between women and men has a decades-long 
history within the institutions of the European Union.  While its constitutional status may be 
shaky (Shaw, 2002), it nonetheless seems well armoured by institutionalisation to resist any 
decline coming from a shift in policy perspectives of the kind described here. 
 
This section will document that the principles underpinning LEGO
® thinking does seem to be 
weakening, if not eliminating, the EU’s commitment to gender equality and to its concerns for 
advancing women’s equality with men.  Two mechanisms are at work, and can be labelled this 
way: (1) folding gender in and (2) writing women out.  For each of three principles discussed, 
                                                 
10 This article “enshrines the principle of gender mainstreaming into the Treaty, providing that ‘in all the activities 
referred to in this Article [i.e. a list of E.C. policies], the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to 
promote equality, between men and women.’” (Shaw, 2002: 217).  For a history of gender mainstreaming from an 
insider see Stratigaki (2005). 
 
11 In 2006 various directives on gender equality were consolidated into a single “recast” directive (2006/54, 5 July 
2006).  It regulates the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of women and 
men in relation to employment and occupation, bringing together four previous directives: equal pay; the amended 
2002 directive on equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment; the 1986 directive on equal 
treatment in occupational social security schemes; and what is termed the burden-of-proof directive of 1997.  For 
handy access to these documents see http://www.karat.org/enp/gender_equality.html#sec.  There are also directives 
linked to article 13 for the other categories guaranteed protection against discrimination. 
 
12 On this division of labour, see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/index_en.html, consulted 
21 March 2007.  
 
13 For the reports to the Council since 2004 see: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/gender_mainstreaming/activity_reports_en.html 
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one or both mechanism is present, associated with a change in the objectives for gender and 
women’s equality and with the links between objectives and instruments.   
 
The method used to track these mechanisms is a comparative one, in which the treatment of 
women and gender before the EU began playing with LEGO
® is compared, via a textual analysis 
of key documents in the realms of employment and social inclusion and via interviews with key 
informants within the Commission.
14  This type of comparison is necessary for strong analytic 
reasons.  If one looks only at the Union’s actions on gender or on equal opportunity, as many 
studies of equal opportunities and mainstreaming do, a great deal of liveliness is visible.  The 
machinery is actively operating.  The argument of this paper, however, is that such work and the 
issues of women and gender more generally are actually being confined to a shrinking space 
within the discourse and actions of the Union.  This space can only be mapped by looking 
beyond the official domain of equal opportunities. 
 
Implications of the LEGO
® principle that security depends on employability and learning  
As mentioned above, raising employment rates has been an objective of European economic and 
social policy for over a decade.  This goal underpins both the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) and the social inclusion process associated with the Lisbon Strategy since 2000.  The 
notion is quite simply that Europe can not afford to have its employment rate lowered by high 
rates of non-participation in the labour market, whether by women substituting care for 
employment or by other categories without access to employment.   
 
The initial Lisbon Strategy set an employment rate target for women of 60%, to be achieved by 
2010; this remains the target.  At the same time, there was an effort “to make work pay,” not 
only so that low-wage work would be sufficiently attractive to induce participation but also that 
supports would be in place to enable people to take up employment.  Childcare and other 
supports for “reconciling work and family life” were the preferred instrument for achieving the 
later.  Indeed, quickly after putting the Lisbon strategy in place, a specific target for childcare 
spaces was agreed to at the Barcelona Council meeting in March 2002. 
 
This focus on employment is not new.  Equal opportunity interventions have always had a 
significant market-making focus (Lewis, 2006: 420-21).  The initiation of the EES in 1997 
coincided with the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming and the original version of the 
strategy included “a high profile commitment to advancing gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming” (Fagen, Grimshaw and Rubery, 2006: 571).  This commitment included 
“strengthening the policies for equal opportunities” as one of four pillars of the EES, and other 
grounds for discrimination were folded in with gender.
15 
                                                 
14 Other central concerns of the equal opportunities agenda, such as access to decision-making or international 
actions, are not examined in this paper. In part this is for lack of time and space and in part because the three 
LEGO
® principles primarily concern analyses of social and employment policies.  
 
15 The 1998 Employment Guidelines, adopted by the Council on 15 December 1997 are found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/guidelines_en.htm. Three blockages to equal 
opportunities were identified: gender gaps (in employment rates and some sectors of employment) and inadequate 
instruments for reconciling work and family life, for facilitating a return to work and for promoting the integration 
of persons with disabilities into working life. 
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But, the EES has been altered over the decade, and in each adjustment to the strategy, less is 
written about women and gender as well as less about equal opportunities.
16  The Employment 
Guidelines associated with the EES have been steadily stripped of this objective over the years 
that correspond to the EU taking up LEGO
® ; the instruments intended to implement it have been 
assigned to other objectives.   
 
In 2003 the equal opportunities pillar disappeared, when 10 priorities were listed instead of four 
pillars.  A single gender equality guideline remained as sixth of 10, while Member States were 
instructed to “adopt a gender-mainstreaming approach across each of the priorities.”  At the same 
time, LEGO
® language made a strong entry. The third priority became “addressing change and 
promoting adaptability and mobility in the labour market” and the fourth was to “promote 
development of human capital and lifelong learning.”  
 
It was at this time that the Lisbon mid-term review process was launched by the two Kok reports 
cited above.  The second report proposed National Reform Programmes (NRP) to replace the 
National Action Plans on Employment.  “In the NRP guidelines, the gender equality guideline 
itself disappeared” (Fagen, Grimshaw, and Rubery, 2006: 572).  In the post-review context, the 
employment guidelines are integrated with those of growth and jobs and set on a three-year 
cycle, the first being for 2005-08.
17  In the specifically employment guidelines (#17 to #24), there 
is none that targets gender equality.  Instead, improving women’s employment rates and services 
and reducing gender gaps are dispersed across the guidelines.  The new guidelines are, moreover, 
even more strongly LEGOist.  In classically LEGO-like terms, there is a call for promoting “a 
life-cycle approach to work” (#18), “expanding and improving investment in human capital” 
(#23) and “adapting training systems in response to new competence requirements” (#24).   
 
These changes have consequences.  As the EGGSIE network’s analysis of reports submitted by 
Member States documents, the decline in emphasis in the guidelines has been accompanied by 
“reduced attention to gender mainstreaming and gender equality objectives in the reports” and in 
addition no gender mainstreaming has been developed for the integrated employment, growth 
and macro-economic guidelines (Fagen, Grimshaw and Rubery, 2006: 573).  Instead, the 
attention of the Member States, and any pressure that the open method of coordination (OMC) 
process might exert, is going to objectives and instruments promoting investments in human 
capital and so on. 
 
A second mechanism at work in the treatment of employment and activation is one that folds in 
women and gender to other programmes and uses the instruments of those programmes for 
promoting improvements in women’s situation and, to a lesser extent, gender relations.  Three 
examples can be given: the redesign of the machinery of governance; the EQUAL Community 
Initiative within the European Social Funds; and the Progress initiative in the social inclusion 
process. 
                                                 
16 All employment guidelines are found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/guidelines_en.htm 
 
17 The full list is in Rodriques in Diamond (2005: 51). 
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In jurisdictions where LEGO
® principles have been longer in place, there has been a clear 
tendency to redesign the governmental machinery of gender equality (for example, Dobrowolsky 
and Jenson, 2004).  In such cases, a general “diversity” frame is often preferred to one of gender 
equality.  In several liberal welfare regimes gender has been folded into agencies dealing with all 
types of discrimination.  For example, Ireland has established an Equality Authority, naming 
nine prohibited grounds for discrimination, one of which is gender. The Authority’s theme is 
“Equality in a diverse Ireland.”
18  Beginning in September 2007, the Commission on Equality 
and Human Rights (CEHR) in the United Kingdom will merge the Commission on Racial 
Equality, the Disability Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission. The latter 
has had responsibility for ending sex discrimination.
 19   
 
All Member States have not moved in such a direction, but there is nonetheless evidence that EU 
institutions are doing so, as the “anti-discrimination” themes gain visibility and as gender 
questions are increasingly treated alongside them.  For example, within the College, the Group of 
Commissioners on Fundamental Rights, Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities was 
created in 2005 by President Barroso.  It replaced the previous grouping of Commissioners on 
Equal Opportunities, that had existed since 1996.  Its mandate is described as “to drive policy 
and ensure the coherence of Commission action in the areas of fundamental rights, anti-
discrimination, equal opportunities and the social integration of minority groups, and to ensure 
that gender equality is taken into account in Community policies and actions, in accordance with 
Article 3§2 of the Treaty” (European Commission, 2006b: 18).   
  
Begun in 2000 with a seven-year life-span, the EQUAL Community Initiative was a self-
proclaimed “laboratory for new ideas to the European Employment Strategy and the social 
inclusion process.”  Its mission is to promote inclusion at work by fighting discrimination and 
exclusion based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.  It is, then, an initiative that follows directly from the broad anti-discrimination 
guarantees of article 13 of the Treaty.  EQUAL was implemented by Member States and funded 
through the European Social Fund.
20  One of its four pillars was equal opportunities for men and 
women, with the focus on services as well as flexibility in order to promote successful 
reconciliation of work and family life. “Promoting equal opportunities for men and women forms 
an integral part of all the thematic areas chosen in addition to having specific actions reserved for 
it under Pillar 4.”  The advantages of this dual approach were detailed in a report on EQUAL:  
“  … making gender equality exclusively a cross-cutting principle may bear the risk of 
overlooking the need for positive actions.  Taking gender mainstreaming seriously suggests 
therefore to adopt a combination of both.” (EQUAL Managing Authorities, 2006: 8, emphasis in 
original). 
                                                 
18 On the Irish Equality Authority see http://www.equality.ie/index.asp?locID=3&docID=-1 
 
19 For a description, see  http://www.cehr.org.uk/content/purpose.rhtm.  The government of Quebec tried in 2005 to 
replace the gender equality agencies by a comprehensive equality commission but that was resisted by the women’s 
movement and state feminists and subsequently abandoned.   
 
20 Its home page is http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal/index_en.cfm. Consulted 29 March 2007.  See also 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10237.htm 
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The EQUAL Community Initiative is disappearing, however; its final projects have been funded 
and will come to an end in 2008.  The 2007-13 programming cycle for ESF will be very 
different.  Programming focuses on Transnational Cooperation, with a significantly reduced role 
for the Commission.  Moreover, no priorities or pillars are identified; a list of possible “themes 
and sub-themes” is the only orientation, and gender mainstreaming is one of the possible themes, 
while “equal opportunities/increase the participation of women in employment and work-life 
balance” are two possible sub-themes for increasing integration.  The new programmes of the 
structural funds, in other words, are characterised by both writing out and folding in.  Gender 
mainstreaming and equal opportunities appear to be optional programme foci
21 and women have 
become only one category of many potential programming targets.
22  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  
interventions for improving human capital is singled out for attention. 
 
Support for the EES and social inclusion will also come, beginning in 2007, from another new 
programme.  Progress (Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity) will run 
from 2007 until 2013, and will have five sections: employment; social protection and inclusion; 
working conditions; antidiscrimination and diversity; and gender equality.    Gender 
mainstreaming applies to all five sections (see the Official Journal, 15 November 2006).   
PROGRESS’ sections are discrete topics whose relationship to each other is not obvious, and 
this despite it is an explicit effort to implement “streamlining.”  However, what is clear is that 
equal opportunities have been folded into a mixed programme with a set of other matters all 
transversal to the objectives of the EES and social inclusion.  
 
Gender implications of the LEGO
® principle of an orientation to the future 
In the section presenting the LEGO
® principles, we stressed the change in time perspective that 
is a key part of this new thinking.  Present conditions may be subordinated to future benefits, and 
certainly investments made now are presented as key to that future.  The investment metaphor is 
currently strong in the EU, as noted above.  It became particularly prevalent as the mid-term 
review of the Lisbon strategy adopted the human capital perspective and those responsible for 
education and training turned their sights towards ECEC. 
 
There are two results of these shifts that we can identify.  Women and gender have been written 
out of the innovation focus of the post-review Lisbon strategy, even as investments in education 
and training – labelled as such or termed “human capital” – have dominated eurospeak.  In the 
Communication from the President and Vice-President of the Commission to the spring Council 
meeting in 2005, the “new start for the Lisbon strategy” emphasised these investment 
instruments as the way to achieve the objectives of full employment, quality and productivity at 
work, and social cohesion and social inclusion.  In this clarion call for reform and 
                                                 
21 The report of the EQUAL Managing Authorities (2006: 7, emphasis in original) expressed a clear concern in 
advance about the way gender mainstreaming was being presented, leading to the reminder that: “The gender 
equality commitment of the Treaty and the clear provisions in the proposed ESF Regulation are obligations, 
which ask for a material and not a symbolic response in the ESF Programming documents and should not be seen as 
an ‘optional extra’.” 
 
22 See the Orientation Note of the Commission, as well as general information about the 2007-13 cycle on 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal/news/200702-trans_en.cfm. Consulted 16 April 2007.   Jenson, EUSA 2007   14 
“modernisation,” women are mentioned only in the context of their labour market potential and 
the only blockage mentioned is the gender pay gap (European Commission, 2005a: 24). 
 
This lack of attention is a significant silence compared to the Lisbon documents of 2000 which 
spoke not only of employment rates and the gender pay gap, but also of the need for equal 
opportunities and increasing the enrolment and success rates of women in science and technical 
education (Presidency Conclusions, March 2000; European Commission, 2003).  Indeed, in the 
Social Agenda 2000-05, which was a direct emanation of the Lisbon agenda, providing “access 
of women to ICT and other scientific and technological jobs, particularly by enhancing the 
participation of women in relevant education and training” was one of the routes to success of 
the knowledge economy (Social Policy Agenda, 2000: 19; see also Rodriques, 2002). 
 
It is also a significant silence in comparison to the attention lavished on young people in the 
same document.  The President of the Commission used his important 2005 Communication to 
present detailed attention to youth and the European Youth Pact.  Indeed, discussions of 
childcare and reconciliation of work and family life were transferred from chapters on women or 
adult workers to those on youth (European Commission, 2005a: 25).   
 
In the key documents mentioned above, ones that display an orientation to the future via an 
investment focus, attention to women and gender is mostly absent.  The BEPA (2007) paper on 
Investing in Youth does have a short section on “Gender equality as a leverage for the well-being 
of children,” and a consistent gender-based analysis of education, poverty and so on runs through 
the paper.  But this paper is the exception that proves the rule.  
 
Women and gender have been dramatically written out of the education field.  After 2000, the 
Lisbon-associated documents made numerous references to gender imbalances in educational 
streams, particularly mathematics, science and technology.   In the technical work around 
benchmarks, gender-differentiated statistics were presented.  When benchmarks were proposed 
in 2002 this analysis of gender imbalance was fully developed and a benchmark proposed: “By 
2010, all Member States will have at least halved the level of gender imbalance among graduates 
in the above mentioned fields whilst securing an overall significant increase of the total number 
of graduates, compared to the year 2000” (European Commission, 2002: 13-14; see also 
European Council, 2003).  By 2005, however, the process of writing out women was in full 
swing.  For example, the communication from the Commission, Modernising education and 
training: a vital contribution to prosperity and social cohesion in Europe (European Council and 
Commission, 2005), was part of the mid-term review of Lisbon Strategy.  It presents a gendered 
analysis of the data, but is virtually silent on women and on gender differences in the narrative 
analysis, … and this despite the fact that the analysis is framed in terms of equity as well as 
efficiency.  
 
In places where in previous discussions where inequitable gender patterns had been observed and 
commented upon, the joint progress report from the Council and Commission turns to a classic 
LEGO
® formulation and says (European Council and Commission, 2005: 11): 
 
Investments should be targeted on areas where the social and economic returns are 
highest, thereby effectively combining efficiency and equity. In this respect, Member   Jenson, EUSA 2007   15 
States’ efforts towards achieving the EU benchmarks related to early school leaving, 
completion of upper-secondary education, and key competences, need to be stepped up in 
the coming years. In particular, investment in pre-school education is of paramount 
importance for preventing school failure and social exclusion, and for laying the 
foundations for further learning. 
 
This statement was explicitly preparing the way for the 2006 Communication analysed above.  
There, women are not mentioned in the Communication on efficiency and equity in education, 
and gender receives a single mention in a note.  Nor are girls mentioned (European Commission, 
2006a). Despite the gender analysis of the data which show only slight progress towards the 
benchmarks set after 2000, they have simply been written out of the investment discourse, 
replaced by a language of investment and ECEC as the instrument to achieve it.  Then, in 2007 
the 20 core indicators for monitoring progress towards the Lisbon objectives in education and 
training were headed by participation in pre-school education, a matter that had gone 
unmentioned in the list of indicators developed in 2003 for the work programme of Education & 
Training 2010.  ECEC was also nowhere to be found among the benchmarks developed in these 
years, when a gender analysis had had their place. 
 
Implications of the principle that we all benefit from playing play with LEGO
® 
With respect to this third LEGO
® principle, most of the change has involved the identification of 
a new goal – a sustainable fertility rate – alongside the activation goal.  Thus, the future of 
European society is supposedly assured by allowing adults to have the number of children they 
want.  Access to good services is supposedly the instrument to achieve this goal (for example, 
SPC, 2006: 3).
23  This demographic focus is not new. It was a sub-theme in discussions, for 
example, when Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission, but then it took a 
definite second-place to an equality agenda of facilitating employment and the reconciliation of 
family and work life.
24   In recent years, the “problem” of demographic sustainability attracts 
much more attention.  And here as well LEGOist terms are finding their place. Even the social 
dialogue process, one that emerged from the classic institutions of the European social model, 
has introduced the theme of “quality child care,” the vocabulary of those who focus on ECEC as 
a foundation for child development and not simply “daycare” as a service for working parents. 
Thus, the document for a First-stage consultation of European social partners on reconciliation 
of professional, private and family life (SEC [2006] 1245) is framed much more in terms of the 
need for quality care than was the spring 2002 Barcelona European Council, the meeting 
establishing explicit targets for service levels (“to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of 
children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 3 
years of age” – art. 32.  The Council neglected to mention anything about the quality of child 
care, and this despite producing a document that stressed the “quality” of everything else 
European (jobs, health care, environment, and so on).
25  At the same time as ECEC rather than 
                                                 
23 For a somewhat sceptical discussion of these claims see Jenson (2006). 
 
24 On demography and child care in the Delors years see Ross (2001: 188-89).  
 
25 This narrow focus and absence of concern about quality provoked criticism, including during the major 
conference on child care organised in fall 2004 by the Dutch presidency. See for example the comments by Peter 
Moss (2004), who in the 1990s headed the Expert Network on Child Care. 
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childcare becomes a target for successful investment in human capital, it is transformed into a 
policy for ensuring the future well-being of European society more than an instrument for 
promoting equality among adults. 
 
Analytic conclusions: Why are the LEGO
® principles associated with “writing out” and 
“folding in” women and gender? 
 
The preceding analysis has shown that the European Union is reorienting its social policy 
analysis more towards learning for employability, towards investments and to the future, and that 
this has brought not only new policy goals but also greater attention to children and young 
people.  It then showed that there have been simultaneously two processes that affect the 
attention to gender equality.  One involves writing out women and gender and the other folding 
them in with other forms of discrimination and inequality.  As the emphasis on human capital, 
investments, early education and reconciling work and family has risen, the traditional attention 
to inequalities of gender and between women and men in work, education, social inclusion and 
social policy has substantially lessened.   
 
Why should this be the case?  Why would such a reorientation toward a “modernised” social 
model have implications for the Union’s analysis of women and gender?   
 
One reason that might be evoked is a change in political orientation.  Perhaps because the 
Commission has shifted to the centre-right and enlargement has brought in countries with limited 
concerns about equal opportunities, the EU is simply no longer as committed to the goal of 
ensuring gender equality as it was in the heyday of the 1980s and 1990s.  It is, of course, possible 
that commitment has weakened.  Nonetheless, any too rapid embrace of such an explanation 
would have to take into account two counterarguments.   
 
The first is the following.  At the same time that attention to women and gender inequalities 
occupies less space in general social policy analysis – for example, in the mid-term review of 
Lisbon and subsequent ajustments – the machinery of governance of equal opportunities has 
expanded.  The Gender Pact of 2006, the European Institute for Gender Equality, and the annual 
report on equality between women and men to the spring European Council are all innovations 
within the field of equal opportunities themselves.  In other words, the policy domain is not 
being deinstitutionalised; it continues to function at full throttle, at the same time that the analytic 
lens of policy analysis moves on.   
 
If there had been a full-scale and deliberate assault on the EU’s positions on gender, one would 
not have expected the machinery to hold.  However, the lack of general attention is consistent 
with a mismatch between the machinery of government and the importance of a set of policy 
objectives.  Such mismatches are, of course, not uncommon.  Governments are always slower to 
dismantle existing machinery than they are to adjust their analysis.  Institutions may maintain 
internal resources to function even when they no longer exercise much influence. 
 
A second reason not to embrace too quickly the political explanation is that the EU is a large and 
varied policy machine.  If one part, such as the Presidency of the Commission, alters its policy 
preferences, it is unlikely that all branches will immediately fall into line.  Indeed, it is   Jenson, EUSA 2007   17 
interesting to note that the shift towards the principles of LEGO
® is occurring in a variety of 
locations. The BEPA is close to the President, but other DGs, with quite different analytic 
traditions and approaches have also been promoters of LEGO-like approaches.  Both the social 
inclusion process (including the practices of the open method of coordination) and the DG EAC, 
with its abstract economics analyses have been pushing these principles.  Both those concerned 
with employment and those focused on social policy have adopted investment-oriented 
instruments.    
 
It seems, in other words, that more is needed to understand better why women and gender are 
being written out and folded in with other anti-discrimination measures.  Here I want to argue 
that the very principles of the LEGO
® perspective make it very difficult to sustain attention to 
gender inequalities.  This happens at several key points for policy.   
 
A true investment focus, as both the BEPA paper (2007) and the Communication on equity and 
efficiency (European Union, 2006a) demonstrate, shifts attention to the young, whether children 
or youth.  And, a focus on children and youth effectively eliminates the space for gender 
analysis.  Neither pre-school nor even school-age girls can be shown to be at a disadvantage in 
comparison to their male counterparts.  They achieve developmental milestones and do well in 
school at the same if not higher levels than do boys.  Indeed, if there are gender-related issues in 
these age groups, the problems and risks are found more among boys than girls.  Therefore, an 
analysis in terms of gender has little place as more attention goes to the early years.   
 
Second, reliance on human capital as a key instrument for achieving investment and increasing 
innovation again narrows the space for gender differentiated analysis.  Women have for several 
decades made significant strides towards increasing their investment in their own human capital.  
Again, if there are gaps they run in the other direction, with boys and men falling behind.   
Therefore, enthusiasm for prescriptions in terms of human capital provides little purchase for a 
thorough-going gender analysis.  Since little policy attention has as yet gone to identifying the 
reasons why investments in human capital pay off less for women than for men, writing out 
women is a likely outcome.  
 
Third, the emphasis on human capital and investment, especially in ECEC, provides a child-
centred justification for one of the major programmes for enabling the reconciliation of work and 
family.  This has had the unintended effect of displacing the attention of the needs of working 
mothers or even fathers for such services.  They are increasingly being justified as an investment 
in human capital and the future, both via their short-term effects on employment rates and their 
long-term advantages for school success, more than as a key instrument to achieve equality 
between women and men. 
 
Fourth, and perhaps the most important reason why LEGO-like ideas have resulted in a process 
of writing-out is that they are ultimately supply-side analyses.  The emphasis is on preparing 
future workers for successful labour market participation. Yet, as decades of feminist analyses 
and whole libraries of publications have shown, gender inequalities are NOT the result of 
women’s inadequate preparation, education, or lack of ambition.  They are due to systemic and 
structural blockages to equal opportunities, whether due to direct discrimination or to the 
working of indirect mechanisms.  These demand-side factors are rendered invisible, however, by   Jenson, EUSA 2007   18 
the emphasis on the supply of human capital and investments now for future returns.  Supply-
side analyses provide little purchase for classic gender analyses to reveal inequalities in the here-
and-now or even for gender mainstreaming to reveal potential unequal effects.  And, when the 
demand-side is addressed, the institutional attention to multiple forms of discrimination has 
resulted in women and gender being folded in with other disadvantaged groups.  
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